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Do Workers’ Remittances Promote Financial Development? 
 
Remittances, funds received from migrants working abroad, to developing countries have 
grown dramatically in recent years from U.S. $2.98 billion in 1975 to close to U.S.$90 billion in 
2003.
1 They have become the second largest source of external finance for developing countries 
after foreign direct investment (FDI), both in absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP (Figures 
1 and 2). Relative to private capital flows, remittances tend to be stable and to increase during 
periods of economic downturns and natural disasters (see Yang, 2006). Furthermore, while a 
surge in inflows, including aid flows, can erode a country’s competitiveness, remittances do not 
seem to have this adverse effect (see Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). 
As researchers and policymakers have come to notice the increasing volume and stable 
nature of remittances to developing countries, a growing number of studies have analyzed their 
development impact along various dimensions, including: poverty, inequality, growth, education, 
infant mortality, and entrepreneurship.
2 However, beyond descriptive accounts of financial 
institutions’ efforts to “bank” remittance recipients (e.g., Orozco and Fedewa, 2005), surprisingly 
little attention has been given to the question of whether remittances promote financial 
development in recipient countries.
3 Yet, this issue is important because financial systems 
perform a number of key economic functions and their development has been shown to foster 
growth and reduce poverty (for example, see King and Levine, 1993; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 
2000a, b; and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2004). Furthermore, this question is relevant 
                                                 
1 Estimates for 2005 put remittances at U.S. $142 billion (World Bank, 2006). 
2 A review of this literature can be found in Section II. 
3 In contrast, there is evidence that private capital flows can help relax financing constraints (see Harrison, Love, and 
McMillan, 2004).   2
since some argue that banking remittance recipients will help multiply the development impact 
of remittance flows (see Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2003; Terry and Wilson, 2005, and World Bank, 2006).  
In this paper, we use balance of payments data on remittance flows received by 99 
countries over the period 1975-2003 to study the impact of workers’ remittances on financial 
development. We specifically examine whether remittances contribute to the development of the 
financial sector by increasing the aggregate level of deposits and/or the amount of credit to the 
private sector extended by the local banking sector.
4 
  Whether and how remittances might affect financial development is a priori unclear. The 
notion that remittances can lead to financial development in developing countries is based on the 
concept that money transferred through financial institutions paves the way for recipients to 
demand and gain access to other financial products and services, which they might not have 
otherwise (Orozco and Fedewa, 2005). At the same time, providing remittance transfer services 
allows banks to “get to know” and reach out to unbanked recipients or recipients with limited 
financial intermediation. For example, remittances might have a positive impact on credit market 
development if banks become more willing to extend credit to remittance recipients because the 
transfers they receive from abroad are perceived to be significant and stable. However, even if 
bank lending to remittance recipients does not materialize, overall credit in the economy might 
increase if banks’ loanable funds surge as a result of deposits linked to remittance flows. 
Furthermore, because remittances are typically lumpy, recipients might have a need for 
financial products that allow for the safe storage of these funds, even if most of these funds are 
                                                 
4 A recent survey of central banks in 40 countries reveals that most countries (90 percent of the sample to be exact) 
collect remittance statistics from commercial banks, while less than 40 percent gather information from money 
transfer companies and post offices (De Luna Martinez, 2005). Therefore, balance of payment statistics tend to 
better reflect the portion of remittances that is transferred through banks.   3
not received through banks. In the case of households that receive their remittances through 
banks, the potential to learn about and demand other bank products is even larger.  
On the other hand, because remittances can help relax individuals’ financing constraints, 
they might lead to a lower demand for credit and have a dampening effect on credit market 
development. Also, a rise in remittances might not translate itself into an increase in credit to the 
private sector if these flows are instead channeled to finance the government or if banks are 
reluctant to lend and prefer to hold liquid assets. Finally, remittances might not increase bank 
deposits if they are immediately consumed or if remittance recipients distrust financial 
institutions and prefer other ways to save these funds. 
An important complication in empirically studying the impact of remittances on financial 
development is the potential for endogeneity biases as a result of measurement error, reverse 
causation, and omitted variables. Officially recorded remittances are known to be measured with 
error.
5 Estimates of unrecorded remittances range from 20 to 200 percent of official statistics on 
remittances (Freund and Spatafora, 2005). Reverse causality is also a concern since better 
financial development might lead to larger measured remittances either because financial 
development enables remittance flows or because a larger percentage of remittances are 
measured when those remittances are channeled through formal financial institutions.  In 
addition, financial development might lower the cost of transmitting remittances, leading to an 
increase in such flows. Finally, omitted factors can explain both the evolution of remittances and 
of financial development, also leading to biases in the estimated impact of remittances on 
financial development. 
                                                 
5 De Luna Martinez (2005) reports that balance of payment statistics produced by developing countries often neglect 
remittances received via money transfer operators and almost always exclude those transferred via informal means 
such as hawala operators, friends, and family members.   4
We address the above concerns, using several different empirical techniques to examine 
the relationship between remittance flows and financial development. First, we conduct fixed and 
random effects estimations to account for unobserved country effects, ignoring other sources of 
biases. Second, we obtain estimates of the impact of remittances over the last decade to account 
for the fact that recent remittances data are likely to be more accurate relative to statistics from 
the beginning of the sample, when less attention was given to these kinds of flows. Third, we 
present estimations including time dummies to control for unobserved time effects or common 
country shocks. Fourth, to mitigate concerns about reverse causality we run regressions lagging 
all regressors and we conduct dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimations à la Arellano and Bover (1995), using lagged regressors as instruments. Finally, we 
perform instrumental variables (IV) estimations to address the potential endogeneity of 
remittances arising from measurement error, omitted factors, and/or reverse causation in a more 
direct and complete manner. In particular, we use economic conditions in the remittance-source 
countries (i.e., the countries where migrants sending remittances reside) to instrument for 
remittance flows received by countries in our sample. 
Our empirical analysis provides support for a robust positive impact of remittances on 
financial sector development, even after controlling for other factors that affect financial 
development and after correcting our estimates for different potential sources of bias. The results 
are invariant to whether we measure financial development by the ratio of deposits or credit to 
GDP. All in all, our findings confirm yet another channel through which remittances can a have a 
positive influence on recipient countries’ development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes the main findings 
from the research on financial development and reviews the literature on the development impact   5
of remittances. Section II discusses the data used and the methodology pursued to study the 
impact of remittances on financial development. Section III presents the empirical results and 
Section IV concludes. 
 
I. Literature  Review 
The determinants of financial development and its effect on growth have been studied 
extensively. The main findings from this literature can be summarized as follows. First, the level 
of inflation has a negative impact on financial sector development (Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 
2001). Second, the degree of capital account openness and the liberalization of domestic 
financial systems help develop the financial sector (see Chinn and Ito, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). Third, a country’s legal origin affects both creditor rights and private credit, 
and the extent of creditor rights protection also has an independent effect on financial sector 
development (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998; Beck, Levine, 
and Loayza, 2000a; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003; Djankov, McLeish, Shleifer, 
2006). Fourth, a country’s geography and initial endowment also influence the extent of financial 
sector development (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002). Finally, other country 
characteristics like the degree of ethnic diversity (Easterly and Levine, 1997) and the type of 
religion practiced by the majority of the population (Stulz and Williamson, 2003) also affect the 
level of financial development, but their impact is less robust (Beck, Demirguck-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003) .  
As for the economic impact of financial development, among others, King and Levine 
(1993), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000a,b) document how 
financial development is associated with greater growth across countries. Similar evidence also   6
exists at the firm and industry levels (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998 and Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). More recently, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) have shown that 
financial development also leads to lower levels of poverty and inequality.   
By analyzing the impact of remittances on financial development, our paper not only 
examines an unexplored potential determinant of financial development, but also this study 
investigates a new channel through which remittances can affect economic development. Most 
studies on the development impact of remittances have focused on issues such as poverty, 
education, entrepreneurial activity, and health. Research on the impact of remittances on poverty 
using household data suggests that these transfers help reduce the level of poverty, but have an 
even greater influence on its severity, as measured by the poverty gap (e.g., Adams, 2004, on 
Guatemala; Lopez-Córdova, 2005, and Taylor, Mora, and Adams, 2005, on Mexico). In addition, 
Maimbo and Ratha (2005) find that in terms of poverty reduction, rural areas in developing 
countries tend to benefit the most because much of the world’s migrants are drawn from these 
areas.  
The finding that remittances help to reduce poverty is confirmed in cross-country studies. 
Based on a dataset of 74 low and middle-income developing countries, Adams and Page (2003) 
find that remittances have a statistically significant impact on reducing poverty. This result is 
also corroborated in a separate analysis for 101 countries over the period 1970-2003, reported in 
the IMF’s 2005 World Economic Outlook.  
Studies that analyze the impact of remittances on education such as Cox and Ureta 
(2003), for the case of El Salvador, Yang (2005), for the case of Philippines, and Hanson and 
Woodruff (2003) and López-Córdova (2005), for Mexico, find that by helping to relax household 
constraints, remittances are associated with improved schooling outcomes for children.   7
  Remittances have also been shown to promote entrepreneurship (Massey and Parrado, 
1998; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001; Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; Yang, 2005). Furthermore, a 
number of studies on infant mortality and birth weight (Kanaiaupuni and Donato, 1999; 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Duryea et al., 2005; and López-Córdova, 2005) have 
documented that at least in the Mexican case, migration and remittances help lower infant 
mortality and are associated with higher birth weight among children in households that receive 
remittances. 
Research on the effect of remittances on economic growth is scant so far and has yielded 
mixed results. Using a panel of 113 countries over almost three decades, Chami et al. (2003) find 
that remittances are negatively associated with economic growth. This result is consistent with 
their model in which remittances weaken recipients’ incentives to work and, therefore, lead to 
poor economic performance. Solimano (2003), on the other hand, finds a positive association 
between remittances and growth for a panel of Andean countries, while the IMF’s 2005 World 
Economic Outlook highlights the lack of correlation between these variables, at least at the 
country level.  
Finally, two recent studies by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) and Mundaca (2005) 
show that the impact of remittances on growth can depend on the level of financial development 
in a country. However, these studies reach very different conclusions. Using a panel of more than 
100 countries for the period 1975-2003, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) show that remittances 
help promote growth in less financially developed countries. They argue that this is evidence that 
agents compensate for the lack of development of local financial markets using remittances to 
ease liquidity constraints and to channel resources towards productive uses that foster economic 
growth. Mundaca (2005) analyzes the effect of workers’ remittances on growth in countries in   8
Central America, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic using a panel data set over 1970 to 2003.  
She finds that controlling for financial development in the analysis strengthens the positive 
impact of remittances on growth and concludes that financial development potentially leads to 
better use of remittances, thus boosting growth. Neither study, however, investigates the impact 
of remittances on financial development. Our paper contributes to the literature by directly 
addressing this issue, exploring the impact of remittances on bank deposits and credit to the 
private sector. 
 
II.   Empirical methodology and data 
We empirically examine the relationship between financial development and remittances 
by estimating a number of variants of equation (1), depending on the assumptions made about 
the error term and the exogeneity of remittances. 
FDi,t= β1Remi,t + β2
’Xi,t + αi + ui , t          (1) 
where i refers to the country and t refers to the time period from 1975 to 2003. However, data for 
the complete time period are not available for all countries and countries are only included if at 
least five years of data are available. A complete list of countries and time periods is given in 
Appendix 1. Table 1 provides definitions and sources for each of the variables in our estimations, 
while Table 2 presents descriptive statistics.  
FD, financial development, refers either to the ratio of bank credit to the private sector or 
the share of bank deposits expressed as a percentage of GDP.
6 These are the standard measures 
of financial depth used in the literature (e.g., King and Levine, 1993). Data to construct these 
ratios come from the International Financial Statistics (IMF) and the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank).  As shown in Table 2, there is considerable variation in financial   9
development for our sample of countries with the ratio of deposits to GDP ranging from 1.74% 
to 161.40% and the ratio of credit to GDP varying from 0.46% to 121.46%.  
Rem refers to the ratio of remittances to GDP. The data on remittances are obtained from 
the IMF’s 2005 World Economic Outlook. With some exceptions, these data are constructed as 
the sum of three items in the Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook (IMF): workers’ 
remittances  (current transfers made by migrants who are employed and resident in another 
economy); compensation of employees (wages, salaries and other benefits earned by nonresident 
workers for work performed for resident of other countries); and migrant transfers (financial 
items that arise from the migration or change of residence of individuals from one economy to 
another).
7 Figures 3 and 4 show the top ten remittance recipient countries in our sample based on 
averages for the period 1975-2003, measured both in U.S. billion dollars and as a proportion of 
GDP. India ($U.S. 4.26 billion), Mexico ($U.S. 4.82 billion), Egypt ($U.S. 3.27 billion), 
Philippines ($U.S. 2.95 billion) and Turkey ($U.S. 2.44 billion) are among the largest recipients 
of remittances in absolute terms as shown in Figure 3. Relative to the size of the economy, 
remittances are especially high among low-income, small economies such as Jordan (18.61%), 
Tonga (17.86%), Moldova (11.66%), Haiti (10.09%), Vanuatu (8.03%), and El Salvador (8.01%) 
as shown in Figure 4.   
The matrix X refers to a set of variables that the literature has found to affect financial 
development. In all estimations we control for country size, defined as the log of GDP in 
constant dollars, and the level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita. These 
variables are included on the grounds that financial sector development requires paying fixed 
costs that become less important the larger the size of the economy and the richer the country. 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 In Appendix 3 we also show estimates for financial development defined as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP.   10
Also, GDP per capita can proxy for the quality of legal institutions in the country which have 
been shown to have a positive impact on financial development.  
In all models, we also control for inflation, measured as the annual percentage change in 
the GDP deflator. Studies have that shown that inflation distorts economic agents’ decision-
making regarding nominal magnitudes, discouraging financial intermediation, and promoting 
saving in real assets (Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001).  
Current and capital account openness has also been found to have a positive effect on 
financial development (see Chinn and Ito, 2002). We include a number of variables to control for 
the degree of capital and current account openness.
8 First, we include a dummy for the presence 
of dual exchange rates regimes. Second, we include the ratio of capital inflows to GDP 
(including aid, FDI, and portfolio flows).
9 Lastly, we control for the share of exports to GDP. 
Countries that have liberalized their domestic financial systems removing interest rate 
controls have been shown to be more financially developed (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998). Following earlier studies, we capture periods of domestic financial liberalization with a 
dummy that equals one in cases when there are no controls on domestic interest rates.  More 
details on the sources used to identify such periods are provided in Table 1.  
  The importance of legal origin and creditor rights for the development of the financial 
sector has also been firmly established in the finance literature (e.g., La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000a; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Additions and adjustments to these data from national sources are required for some specific countries. Details are 
provided in Appendix 2. 
8 Chinn and Ito (2002) develop an openness index based on the first principal component of four variables capturing 
the absence of (1) multiple exchange rate regimes, (2) restriction on current account transactions, (3) restrictions on 
capital account transactions, and (4) requirements of the surrender of exports proceeds. Higher values of this index 
indicate greater openness. We prefer our three separate measures because they allow us to disentangle which aspects 
of openness are most critical for financial development. Also, our measures are largely de facto as opposed to de 
jure measures of openness as is the case with the index developed by Chinn and Ito (2002).  
9 We refer to this variable as Other flows to GDP.   11
Levine 2003; and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2006). To control for these factors we include 
an index of Creditor Rights (ranging from 0, weak, to 4, strong) developed by Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006) and a dummy to control for countries with British legal origin (i.e., 
dummy equals 1 if legal system is based on Common Law). An alternative view of the 
determinants of financial development, stresses the importance of geography and initial 
endowments (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002). To control for these factors, we 
include countries’ absolute latitude, a frequently used proxy of endowments (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine, 2003).
10 Since our measures of legal institutions and endowments do not vary 
over time, these variables are not included in the fixed effect estimations and only appear in the 
random effect regressions.
 11 
  We first examine the relationship between financial development and remittances by 
running fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) regressions, ignoring the potential for biases 
due to reverse causation, omitted factors, or measurement error. FE and RE estimations make 
different assumptions about the error term in equation (1). In the FE model, the error term is the 
sum of αi and ui,t where αi represents individual specific fixed parameters to be estimated and ui,t 
are independent and identically distributed errors with zero mean and constant variance  In the 
RE regressions, both αi and ui,t are independently distributed and, furthermore, both are assumed 
to be independent from the regressors in the equation. In conjunction with these estimations, we 
report F-tests for the joint significance of the fixed effects and Hausman tests comparing the 
efficiency of random vis-à-vis fixed effect estimates. 
                                                 
10 The original paper by Acemoglu et al. (2001) uses settlers’ mortality data as a measure of endowments. However, 
this information is only available for a subset of former colonies. Using this data restricts our sample of countries, 
therefore, we prefer to use absolute latitude as a proxy for endowments. 
11 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) show that the impact of variables such as religion, ethnic diversity or 
political structure on financial development is neither significant nor very robust. Thus, we do not control for these 
factors when investigating the effect of remittances on financial development.   12
The fixed and random effects estimates described above can be biased due to 
measurement error, omitted variables, and reverse causality. The concern about reverse causation 
is justified, considering that our measure of remittances refers to balance of payment statistics 
that largely cover flows transferred through the formal financial system. Thus, it is conceivable 
that remittances may grow over time simply because financial development in the recipient 
countries allows banks to play a greater role in the remittance transfer process. Furthermore, 
biases might also occur because of common omitted variables driving the behavior of both 
remittances and financial development. Finally, measurement error, which is known to plague 
balance of payment statistics on remittances, will also likely bias our estimates. 
We conduct a number of different estimations to address the concerns outlined above. 
First, we separately conduct estimations for the most recent period (1995-2003), because the 
potential for measurement error should be smaller in this period, since remittance statistics are 
likely to have improved over time. Second, we conduct estimations including time dummies to 
mitigate the concern for omitted relevant regressors. Third, we try to address the potential bias 
due to reverse causality by conducting estimations lagging regressors and, separately, by using 
lagged values of the regressors as instruments in a GMM dynamic framework à la Arellano and 
Bover (1995).  
Two equations, (2) and (3), are estimated as part of the dynamic system GMM estimates  
FDi,t= γFDi,t-1+ β1Remi,t + β2
’Xi,t+ αi+ ui , t         (2) 
FDi,t - FDi,t-1 = γ(FDi,t-1 - FDi,t-2) + β1(Remi,t -Remi,t-1) + β2
’(Xi,t - X i,t-1)+ ui,t - ui,t-1   (3) 
 
In equations (2) and (3), the use of instruments is required to deal with the likely 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables (most notably, remittances) and with the fact that in   13
both equations the error term is correlated with the lagged dependent variable. Assuming that (a) 
the error terms are not serially correlated, (b) the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous 
(i.e., explanatory variables are uncorrelated with future realization of the error terms), and (c) 
there is no correlation between the changes in the right hand side variables and the country 
specific effects, αi, then the following moment conditions can be applied to obtain unbiased 
estimates of the regressors: 
E[FDi,t-s.(ui,t - u i,t-1)]=0 for s≥2;  t=3,…,T         (4) 
E[Remi,t-s.(ui,t - u i,t-1)]=0 for s≥2;  t=3,…,T       (5) 
E[Xi,t-s.(ui,t - u i,t-1)]=0 for s≥2;  t=3,…,T       (6) 
E[(FDi,t-s.- FDi,t-s-1)( αi + ui,t)]=0  for  s=1       (7) 
E[(Remi,t-s- Remi,t-s-1).( αi + u i,t)]=0  for  s=1       (8) 
E[(Xi,t-s- Xi,t-s-1).( αi + u i,t)]=0  for  s=1        (9) 
 
Hence, lagged values of the difference of regressors can be used as instruments to estimate the 
equation in levels (i.e., equation 2), and lagged values of the level of regressors can be used as 
instruments for the regressors in the equation in first differences (i.e., equation 3). 
  While using lagged values of the regressors as instruments can help deal with the 
problem of reverse causality, it does not address biases arising due to measurement error, since 
lagged values of the regressors (in particular, remittances) are likely to suffer from this problem 
as well. Therefore, we also present Instrumental Variables (IV) estimations where we use 
external as opposed to internal instruments. In particular, we use economic conditions – GDP per 
capita, real GDP growth, and the unemployment rate - in the top remittance-source countries   14
(i.e., the countries from which migrants send money) as instruments for the remittances flows 
received by the countries in our sample.  
Economic conditions in the remittance-source countries are likely to affect the volume of 
remittance flows that migrants are able to send, but are not expected to affect financial 
development in the remittance receiving countries in ways other than through its impact on 
remittances or through the effect on other variables we already control for like exports or capital 
flows. Because bilateral remittance data are largely unavailable, we identify the top remittance-
source countries for each country in our sample, using bilateral migration data from the OECD’s 
Database on Immigrants and Expatriates. This dataset identifies the top five OECD countries 
that receive the most migrants from each remittance-recipient country.
12 Here we assume that 
these OECD countries receive the bulk of the migrants from the countries in our sample and 
account for the majority of the remittance flows sent to the countries in our sample. We construct 
three instruments by multiplying, respectively, the GDP per capita, the real GDP growth, and the 
unemployment rate, in each of the top five remittance-source countries by the share of migration 
to each of these five OECD countries.
13  
 
III. Empirical  Results 
Table 3 reports FE estimates of equation (1) for the share of deposits and credit to GDP, 
assuming that remittances are exogenous and adequately measured. In all regressions we control 
for the log of GDP, the level of GDP per capita, the inflation rate, the presence of dual exchange 
rates and for the extent of current and capital account openness. Because the variable capturing 
                                                 
12 http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,2340,en_2825_494553_34063091_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
13 Note that the bilateral migration data is only available for 2000, so the weights we use are constant. The time 
variation arises from the series on the GDP per capita, real growth rate, and unemployment rate in remittance-source 
countries.   15
periods of domestic financial liberalization is available for fewer countries, we report separate 
estimations including this variable along with the others.  
Across all estimations, we find that remittances have a positive coefficient, but the size of 
the coefficient in the bank deposits to GDP regressions is almost twice as large the coefficient in 
bank credit to GDP regressions. Assuming a causal relationship, a one percentage point increase 
in the share of remittances to GDP suggests around a 0.5-0.6 percentage point increase in the 
ratio of deposits to GDP, while it leads to at most a 0.3 percentage point rise in the share of credit 
to GDP.   
As expected, the results on Table 3 also confirm that financial development is positively 
affected by a country’s size and level of income, but negatively influenced by inflation and the 
adoption of multiple exchange rate regimes. While the share of exports to GDP has a positive 
influence on financial development, the size of capital inflows appears to have no effect. 
Random effects estimates shown in Table 4 yield similar results to the fixed effects 
results reported in Table 3. Remittances have a positive relationship with both deposits and 
credits and again the coefficient on the former is almost twice as large. Including controls such 
as latitude, legal origin and creditor rights, which do not change over time, does not affect the 
main results.
14 As before, country size, income, and exports have a positive impact on financial 
development, but inflation and the presence of dual exchange regimes have a negative impact. 
Though the findings from the RE estimates are very similar to the FE results, the Hausman tests 
at the bottom of Table 4 indicate that the FE specification is preferable so from now on we only 
report results based on FE estimates. 
                                                 
14 A possible explanation for why these additional controls – legal origin, creditor rights, and latitude - are not 
themselves significant might be that they are highly correlated with GDP per capita also included in the estimations.   16
To verify the robustness of the FE results obtained thus far we conduct a number of 
additional estimations. First, to account for the presence of potential outliers we drop 
observations at the top 1 and bottom 1 percent of the distribution for each variable (see Table 5). 
Second, to limit concerns about measurement error we report results for the period 1995-2003 
(see Table 6). We speculate that the degree of measurement error is likely to be smaller during 
this later period, as opposed to during the 1970s and 1980s, given that countries have taken steps 
over time to improve their balance of payments statistics and, in particular, to better measure 
remittances. Also, in recent years competition in the remittance market has led to a decline in the 
cost of formal remittances that might have led to an increase in measured remittances (i.e., 
informal remittances could have declined as a result). Third, to control for common time effects, 
we run a two-way fixed effect model including country and time dummies (see Table 7). Fourth, 
to address the potential for reverse causation we conduct FE estimations substituting regressors 
for their lags (see Table 8) and we report dynamic system GMM estimations à la Arellano and 
Bover (1995), where lags of the regressors are used as instruments for the variables in the model 
(see Table 9). The problem with estimations including lagged regressors (either directly or as 
instruments like in the GMM case) is that they cannot correct for biases arising from 
measurement error, since these would also affect lags of the questionable variable/s. Hence, 
finally, in order to correct for endogeneity biases that might arise due to measurement error, we 
present separate instrumental variables regressions using economic conditions in the remittance-
source countries as instruments (see Table 10).  
Removing potential outliers does not change our results in any significant way. Table 5 
shows that both the significance and the magnitude of the remittance variable remain unchanged 
when we drop observations in the top and bottom one percent of the distribution for each   17
variable in the model. Remittances continue to have a positive effect on both credit and deposits 
and, as before, the impact on deposits appears to be twice as large. Similarly, the estimates for 
the period 1995-2003, shown on Table 6, also yield results similar to those encompassing the 
overall period. 
While remittances continue to have a positive and significant effect on financial 
development, including time dummies reduces the impact of remittances on deposits and credit 
(see Table 7). In particular, the size of the coefficient on deposits drops from close to 0.6 to 0.2-
0.3. Similarly, introducing time dummies reduces the impact of remittances on credit from an 
average of 0.3 to closer to 0.2.   
In order to deal with the possibility that remittances are endogenous due to reverse 
causation we conduct estimations lagging remittances (as well as other regressors) two periods 
(see Table 8) and we perform dynamic system GMM estimations where we use lags of the 
regressors as instruments (see Table 9). When we lag regressors, we continue to find that 
remittances have a positive impact on credit and deposits. In this case, a one percentage point 
increase in remittances leads to 0.4-0.5 percentage increase in the ratio of deposits and 0.3-0.4 
rise in credit to GDP. Using lags as instrument in the GMM estimations, results in remittances 
having a lower impact on financial development. A one percentage point increase in remittances 
leads to at most a 0.19 percentage point rise in deposits and a 0.12 percentage point increase in 
credit. Furthermore, in the case of the credit estimations, once we control for financial 
liberalization, remittances are no longer significant in the credit equations, perhaps due to the 
smaller number of observations. 
While lagging regressors or using lags as instrument might help deal with the problem of 
reverse causation, it does not address the concern that the estimates reported so far might be   18
biased due to measurement error. In order to address these issues directly, we conduct 
instrumental variable estimations where we use economic conditions in remittance-source 
countries as instruments. In particular, we include the GDP per capita, real growth rate, and 
unemployment rate of the five OECD countries that are the top recipients of migrants for each 
remittance-receiving country in our sample. Each of these variables is separately weighted by the 
share of migration from the corresponding country to each of those five OECD destinations.
15   
  Table 10 shows the results from the instrumental variables estimations described above 
We conduct and report two tests to show the validity of our instruments. First, we present the F- 
statistic for weak instruments as suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). This is a test of the 
significance of our instruments in predicting remittances. In every regression the F-statistics is 
above the critical value, at 5 percent significance, indicating that our estimates do not suffer from 
a weak instruments problem. Second, we report the Sargan test of overidenditfying restrictions. 
The joint null hypothesis in this case is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term 
and that excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Again, these 
tests confirm the validity of our instruments. 
  As for the impact of remittances on financial development, we continue to find that they 
have a positive and significant impact on both credit and deposits to GDP. Though the size of the 
coefficients are in this case much larger than those obtained in previous estimations they are 
within a range that can be justified by the presence of measurement error in the remittance 
series.
16  These results confirm that the positive impact of remittances on financial development 
is not due to endogeneity biases. 
 
                                                 
15 We focus exclusively on the top five OECD destinations for migrants for each country in our sample because the 
OECD data only provides bilateral migration data vis-à-vis 5 countries.    19
IV. Conclusions 
Workers’ remittances, flows received from migrant workers residing abroad, have 
become the second largest source of external finance for developing countries in recent years.  In 
addition to their increasing size, the stability of these flows despite financial crises and economic 
downturns make them a reliable source of funds for developing countries. While the 
development potential of remittance flows is increasingly being recognized by researchers and 
policymakers, the effect of remittances on financial development remains largely unexplored.  
Better understanding the impact of remittances on financial development is important given the 
extensive literature on the growth enhancing and poverty reducing effects of financial 
development.  
This paper is a first effort to try to fill this gap in the literature. Using balance of 
payments data on remittance flows to 99 countries for the period 1975-2003, we investigate the 
impact of remittances on bank deposits, as well as on bank credit to the private sector. We find 
that remittances have a significant and positive impact on bank deposits and credit to GDP. This 
result is robust to using different estimation techniques and accounting for endogeneity biases 
arising from omitted factors, reverse causation, and measurement error.   
                                                                                                                                                             
16 See Appendix 4 for a discussion about coefficient biases due to measurement error.    20
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable name Source
Remittances to GDP Balance of Payments Statistics (IMF). Data reported in 
WEO (2005)
Bank credit to GDP International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Bank deposit to GDP Idem
GDP per capita World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Log of GDP Idem
Inflation Idem
Exports to GDP Idem
Dual exchange rate Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (IMF)
Financial liberalization Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (IMF), Demirgrüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998), Abiad and Mody (2005), Bandiera et al (2000), 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2004), Laeven (2003), Tornell, 
Westermann and Martinez (2004)
Other flows to GDP Balance of Payments Statistics (IMF)
Latitude La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)
British legal origin World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Creditor rights Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2005)
GDP per capita in remittance-source 
countries (in thousands)
Database on Immigrants and Expatriates (OECD) and 
World Development Indicators (World Bank)
GDP growth in remittance-source 
countries 
Idem
Unemployment in remittance-source 
countries 
Idem
The index measures the legal rights that shareholders and creditors have that enable 
them to extract a return on their investment from the insiders. The creditor rights 
index varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights).
GDP per capita of the five principal OECD recipients of migration for each country 
in our sample, weighted by share of total migration to these countries. Focusing on 
remittance receiving country Z, and assuming that the top five OECD countries that 
receive migrants from Z are countries A, B, C, D, and E, the weighted GDP per 
capita is constructed as: Sum over i[GDP per capita i *(migration of Z to i)/(sum of 
migration from Z received by A through E)], where i=A to E.
Dummy equals to 1 indicates liberalization in deposit and loan interest rates.
Sum of foreign direct investment + non-FDI private inflows + aid flows. Variable 
expressed as a percentage of GDP
Absolute value of the latitude of a country, scaled between zero and one.
Dummy equals to 1 indicates countries with Common Law legal origins.
Variable definitions
GDP growth of the five principal OECD recipients of migration for each country in 
our sample, weighted by share of total migration to these countries. Focusing on 
remittance receiving country Z, and assuming that the top five OECD countries that 
receive migrants from Z are countries A, B, C, D, and E, the weighted GDP per 
capita is constructed as: Sum over i[GDP per capita i *(migration of Z to i)/(sum of 
migration from Z received by A through E)], where i=A to E.
Unemployment of the five principal OECD recipients of migration for each country 
in our sample, weighted by share of total migration to these countries. Focusing on 
remittance receiving country Z, and assuming that the top five OECD countries that 
receive migrants from Z are countries A, B, C, D, and E, the weighted GDP per 
capita is constructed as: Sum over i[GDP per capita i *(migration of Z to i)/(sum of 
migration from Z received by A through E)], where i=A to E.
Sum of remittances + migrant transfers + workers compensation, depending on the 
country (see the data appendix for details). Variable is expressed as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Deposit money banks' credit extended to the private sector expressed as a 
percentage of GDP.
Deposit money banks' deposits expressed as a percentage of GDP.
GDP per capita in thousands of constant 1995 US$.
Log of GDP in constant 1995 US$.
GDP deflator (annual %).
Total exports expressed as percentage of GDP.
Dummy equals to 1 indicates the presence of multiple exchange rates.







Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Bank deposits to GDP (%) 1528 29.24 20.58 1.74 161.40
Bank credits to GDP (%) 1518 24.79 17.79 0.46 121.56
Remittances to GDP (%) 1528 2.95 4.52 0.00 41.17
Log of GDP (in constant US$) 1528 22.86 1.83 18.56 27.78
GDP Per Capita (in thousands US$) 1528 1.76 1.70 0.12 9.65
Inflation (%) 1528 36.35 380.10 -23.48 12338.66
Dual Exchange Rate 1528 0.20 0.40 0 1
Financial Liberalization 1209 0.37 0.48 0 1
Other flows to GDP (%) 1528 5.99 13.60 -312.81 169.27
Exports to GDP (%) 1528 34.07 23.68 4.31 329.92
Latitude 1528 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.66
British Legal Origin  1528 0.34 0.47 0 1
Creditor Rights 1295 1.55 1.14 0 4
GDP per capita in remittance-source countries  1502 21.93 4.03 7.49 31.94
GDP growth in remittance-source countries  1502 2.78 1.60 -5.65 7.25
Unemployment in remittance-source countries  1187 7.93 2.03 4.03 15.66
Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 1523 37.53 23.62 3.51 152.14  
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Table 3 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Fixed Effects Results 
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t= b1Remi,t + b2Xi,t + ai + ui,t where FD refers to financial development measured as the % of bank deposits 
and, separately, bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of controls including: GDP per capita, 
measured in constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual exchange rates, a dummy 
capturing periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic interest rates; 
Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP; and Exports to GDP, the share of total 
exports as a % of GDP. Country dummies are included, but not shown. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 0.496 0.600 0.278 0.323
[5.38]*** [6.25]*** [3.34]*** [3.36]***
Log of GDP 16.376 17.723 10.511 9.758
[13.95]*** [13.74]*** [9.94]*** [7.59]***
GDP Per Capita 2.946 2.514 6.615 8.057
[3.30]*** [2.22]** [8.22]*** [7.12]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[3.35]*** [3.39]*** [2.59]*** [2.39]**
Dual Exchange Rate -1.797 -1.913 -2.181 -2.170
[2.27]** [2.39]** [3.04]*** [2.70]***
Other Flows to GDP -0.024 0.006 0.001 -0.001
[1.37] [0.34] [0.07] [0.07]
Exports to GDP 0.195 0.136 0.094 0.109
[8.93]*** [4.00]*** [4.77]*** [3.21]***
Financial Liberalization 0.003 -0.483
[0.01] [0.76]
Constant -357.749 -390.777 -230.538 -215.800
[13.91]*** [13.77]*** [9.96]*** [7.63]***
Observations 1528 1209 1518 1206
Number of countries 92 62 92 62
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.31 0.37 0.28 0.29
F-statistic for country fixed effects 52.40 39.55 53.51 51.74
P-value for country fixed effects 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bank Credit to GDP Bank Deposits to GDP
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Table 4 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Random Effects Results 
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t= b1Remi,t + b2Xi,t + ai + ui,t where FD refers to financial 
development measured as the % of bank deposits and, separately, bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the 
share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of controls including: GDP per capita, measured in constant 
dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual 
exchange rates, a dummy capturing periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a 
dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic interest rates; Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct 
investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP; Exports to GDP, the share of total exports as 
a % of GDP; Latitude, defined in absolute terms and scaled between 0 and 1; British legal origin, a dummy equal to 
1 for countries with Common Law legal tradition, and Creditor rights, an index of creditor rights as defined by 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006). Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 0.627 0.706 0.695 0.723 0.342 0.333 0.364 0.335
[6.67]*** [7.15]*** [7.41]*** [7.15]*** [4.09]*** [3.43]*** [3.88]*** [3.28]***
Log of GDP 7.305 8.830 10.937 10.194 6.305 7.634 7.465 7.733
[10.00]*** [11.60]*** [13.78]*** [12.32]*** [9.70]*** [9.27]*** [8.40]*** [7.84]***
GDP Per Capita 5.541 4.226 1.118 0.276 6.213 5.794 6.008 5.117
[8.40]*** [5.34]*** [1.32] [0.31] [10.58]*** [6.95]*** [6.59]*** [4.94]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[3.40]*** [3.48]*** [3.61]*** [3.49]*** [2.68]*** [2.46]** [2.48]** [2.37]**
Dual exchange rate -2.824 -3.015 -3.323 -3.507 -2.916 -2.913 -3.194 -3.279
[3.47]*** [3.62]*** [4.31]*** [4.12]*** [4.00]*** [3.56]*** [4.14]*** [3.82]***
Other flows to GDP -0.026 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.008
[1.41] [0.09] [0.12] [0.19] [0.17] [0.08] [0.33] [0.39]
Exports to GDP 0.240 0.256 0.267 0.298 0.123 0.179 0.194 0.234
[11.02]*** [7.77]*** [8.47]*** [8.50]*** [6.36]*** [5.47]*** [6.08]*** [6.46]***
Financial liberalization 0.484 0.676 -0.584 -0.429
[0.74] [1.01] [0.91] [0.64]
Latitude -15.030 5.958 -30.351 7.667
[1.61] [0.43] [2.64]*** [0.41]
British legal origin  4.323 4.246 3.345 2.922
[1.13] [1.13] [0.71] [0.58]
Creditor rights 0.103 -0.277 -0.205 -1.033
[0.07] [0.19] [0.12] [0.54]
Constant -156.774 -192.251 -236.244 -222.930 -135.374 -165.733 -158.175 -169.297
[9.70]*** [11.32]*** [13.38]*** [12.36]*** [9.42]*** [9.05]*** [7.98]*** [7.86]***
Observations 1528 1209 1295 1109 1518 1206 1285 1106
Number of countries 92 62 75 56 92 62 75 56
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.19
Hausman test  156.7 162.96 -
a -
a 106.77 153.84 -
a -
a
P-value for Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bank Deposits to GDP Bank Credit to GDP
 
a The Hausman test cannot be performed in this case, because it is impossible to estimate the fixed effects model 
when we include time time invariant variables such as creditor rights, legal origin, and latitude. 
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Table 5 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Fixed Effects Results Removing Potential Outliers 
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t=  b1Remi,t + b2Xi,t + ai + ui,t where FD refers to financial development measured as the % of bank deposits 
and, separately, bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of controls including: GDP per capita, 
measured in constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual exchange rates, a dummy 
capturing periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic interest rates; 
Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP and Exports to GDP, the share of total 
exports as a % of GDP. Outliers, observations in the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution for each variable, are removed. Country dummies are included, 
but not shown. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 0.581 0.596 0.242 0.255
[6.46]*** [6.09]*** [2.88]*** [2.67]***
Log of GDP 15.231 15.461 8.753 8.755
[14.48]*** [12.56]*** [8.77]*** [7.39]***
GDP Per capita 2.289 1.823 5.130 5.239
[2.78]*** [1.66]* [6.60]*** [4.94]***
Inflation -0.009 -0.018 -0.006 -0.013
[1.86]* [2.68]*** [1.44] [1.99]**
Dual exchange rate -0.593 -0.609 -2.475 -2.339
[0.85] [0.81] [3.72]*** [3.17]***
Other flows to GDP -0.019 -0.003 0.130 0.128
[0.44] [0.06] [3.09]*** [2.53]**
Exports to GDP 0.142 0.143 0.039 0.071
[4.82]*** [4.31]*** [1.37] [2.13]**
Financial liberalization 0.423 -0.934
[0.73] [1.64]
Constant -330.654 -337.366 -187.260 -187.728
[14.38]*** [12.48]*** [8.59]*** [7.22]***
Observations 1392 1117 1388 1108
Number of countries 87 59 89 60
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.35 0.22 0.23
Bank Credit to GDP Bank Deposits to GDP
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Table 6 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Fixed Effects Results for 1995-2003 
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t= b1Remi,t + b2Xi,t + ai + ui,t where FD refers to financial development measured as the % of bank deposits 
and, separately, bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of controls including: GDP per capita, 
measured in constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual exchange rates, a dummy 
capturing periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic interest rates; 
Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP and Exports to GDP, share of exports as a % 
of GDP. Country dummies are included, but not shown. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 0.618 0.603 0.287 0.323
[6.66]*** [6.04]*** [3.10]*** [3.19]***
Log of GDP 18.379 19.511 10.876 8.963
[15.39]*** [13.83]*** [9.15]*** [6.30]***
GDP per capita 2.764 0.925 7.368 10.085
[2.99]*** [0.70] [8.00]*** [7.58]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[3.34]*** [3.28]*** [2.25]** [2.19]**
Dual exchange rate -1.874 -1.875 -2.837 -2.658
[2.25]** [2.08]** [3.40]*** [2.90]***
Other flows to GDP 0.008 0.009 0.004 -0.002
[0.42] [0.50] [0.24] [0.12]
Exports to GDP 0.121 0.131 0.097 0.120
[3.70]*** [3.65]*** [2.98]*** [3.30]***
Financial liberalization 0.201 -0.156
[0.29] [0.22]
Constant -406.038 -431.061 -243.145 -202.14
[15.47]*** [13.90]*** [9.31]*** [6.46]***
Observations 1268 1041 1258 1038
Number of countries 70 49 70 49
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.32
Bank Credit to GDP Bank Deposits to GDP
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Table 7 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Two Way Fixed Effects Estimates Including Country and Time Dummies 
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t= b1Remi,t + b2Xi,t + ai + ui,t where FD refers to financial development measured as the % of bank deposits 
and, separately, bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of controls including: GDP per capita, 
measured in constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual exchange rates, a dummy 
capturing periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic interest rates; 
Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP and Exports to GDP, the share of total 
exports as a % of GDP. Country dummies are included, but not shown. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 0.182 0.367 0.207 0.293
[1.83]* [3.48]*** [2.27]** [2.73]***
Log of GDP 6.890 12.337 10.521 11.023
[3.55]*** [5.27]*** [5.95]*** [4.68]***
GDP per capita 3.523 2.829 5.819 7.314
[3.76]*** [2.31]** [6.81]*** [5.89]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[3.23]*** [3.25]*** [2.45]** [2.30]**
Dual exchange rate -0.014 0.013 0.004 0.003
[0.80] [0.70] [0.24] [0.16]
Other flows to GDP 0.201 0.147 0.099 0.110
[9.30]*** [4.34]*** [5.02]*** [3.20]***
Exports to GDP -1.410 -1.398 -2.016 -2.086
[1.79]* [1.76]* [2.78]*** [2.57]**
Financial liberalization 2.790 2.178
[3.52]*** [2.70]***
Constant -134.589 -260.538 -226.933 -242.849
[3.05]*** [4.87]*** [5.65]*** [4.51]***
Observations 1 5 2 81 2 0 91 5 1 81 2 0 6
Number of countries 92 62 92 62
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.40 0.29 0.30
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic for country fixed effects 53.32 39.09 53.68 51.62
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-statistic for time fixed effects 2.82 2.74 1.54 1.51
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
Bank Credit to GDP Bank Deposits to GDP
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Table 8 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Fixed Effect Estimates Lagging Regressors 2 years 
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t=  b1Remi,t-2 + b2Xi,t-2 + ai + ui,t where FD refers to financial development measured as the % of bank 
deposits and, separately, bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of controls including: GDP per 
capita, measured in constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual exchange rates, a 
dummy capturing periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic 
interest rates; Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP and Exports to GDP, the share 
of total exports as a % of GDP.  Time and country dummies are included, but not shown. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 0.418 0.544 0.310 0.372
[3.74]*** [4.76]*** [3.04]*** [3.18]***
Log of GDP 13.481 17.460 11.732 10.403
[8.61]*** [9.88]*** [8.30]*** [5.85]***
GDP per capita 3.221 0.514 7.302 9.826
[3.06]*** [0.39] [7.61]*** [7.23]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[2.71]*** [2.35]** [1.73]* [1.54]
Dual exchange rate -1.231 -0.890 -1.572 -1.358
[1.51] [1.09] [2.09]** [1.62]
Other flows to GDP 0.037 0.049 0.058 0.058
[2.10]** [2.72]*** [3.62]*** [3.15]***
Exports to GDP 0.184 0.121 0.078 0.056
[9.00]*** [3.43]*** [4.15]*** [1.54]
Financial liberalization 2.270 2.279
[2.79]*** [2.74]***
Constant -289.571 -378.758 -256.553 -230.162
[8.42]*** [9.70]*** [8.26]*** [5.86]***
Observations 1398 1123 1392 1120
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.31 0.37 0.29 0.31
Bank Deposits to GDP Bank Credit to GDP
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Table 9 
GMM Dynamic System Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Results reported below are obtained by estimating the following system of equations FDi,t= b1FDi,t-1+ b2Remi,t + b3 
Xi,t + ai + ui,t and FDi,t-FDi,t-1=b1(FDi,t-1-FDi,t-2)+ b2(Remi,t-Remi,t-1) + b3(Xi,t-Xi,t-1) + ui,t-ui,t-1. To compute the system 
estimator, variables in differences are instrumented with lags of their own levels, while variables in levels are 
instrumented with lags of their own differences. FD refers to financial development measured as the % of bank 
deposits and bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of 
controls including: GDP per capita, measured in constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, 
defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual exchange rates, a dummy capturing periods when multiple 
exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic 
interest rates; Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed 
as a % of GDP and Exports to GDP, the share of total exports as a % of GDP. Time dummies are included, but not 
shown. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 0.194 0.148 0.124 0.058
[2.45]** [2.79]*** [2.00]** [0.67]
Log of GDP 1.532 0.680 1.963 2.215
[1.51] [0.94] [2.66]*** [1.92]*
GDP per capita 0.062 0.072 0.322 -0.372
[0.19] [0.15] [0.87] [0.36]
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
[1.15] [1.39] [1.16] [1.20]
Dual exchange rate -2.011 -0.996 0.063 -0.043
[2.03]** [1.42] [0.06] [0.04]
Other flows to GDP 0.055 0.018 0.001 -0.011
[1.05] [1.50] [0.05] [0.70]
Exports to GDP 0.095 0.027 0.022 -0.040
[3.64]*** [1.38] [0.78] [0.91]
Financial liberalization -0.269 -2.725
[0.40] [2.08]**
Lag 1 of deposits to GDP 1.270 1.205
[19.24]*** [20.64]***
Lag 2 of deposits to GDP -0.346 -0.205
[4.73]*** [2.11]**
Lag 3 of deposits to GDP 0.055 0.000
[1.42] [0.00]
Lag 1 of credit to GDP 1.426 1.440
[19.29]*** [19.16]***
Lag 2 of credit to GDP -0.627 -0.630
[5.25]*** [5.01]***
Lag 3 of credit to GDP 0.163 0.155
[2.15]** [1.98]*
Constant -39.458 -17.373 -48.046 -50.802
[1.67]* [1.08] [2.90]*** [2.07]**
Observations 1211 1019 1182 1013
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions 19.4 12.39 26.25 12.09
P-value Sargan test 0.62 0.98 0.24 0.99
Test for 2nd order autocorrelation 1.21 1.2 1.11 1.32
P-value for test for 2nd order autocorrelation 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.19
Bank Deposits to GDP Bank Credit to GDP
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Table 10 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
 Instrumental Variables Fixed Effects Estimates 
Economic conditions in the remittance-source countries are used as instrument for remittances  
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t=  b1Remi,t + b2Xi,t + ai + ui,t where FD refers to financial development measured as the % of bank deposits 
and, separately, bank credit to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is matrix of controls including: GDP per capita,  
measured in constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual exchange rates, a dummy 
capturing periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic interest rates; 
Other flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP and Exports to GDP, the share of total 
exports as a % of GDP. GDP per capita, real GDP growth, and unemployment rates in remittance-source countries, weighted by migration, are used as 
instruments. Time and country dummies are included, but not shown. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Remittances to GDP 4.905 4.228 4.899 5.443
[5.62]*** [5.51]*** [5.76]*** [5.77]***
Log of GDP 26.349 31.716 33.006 47.587
[4.47]*** [4.78]*** [5.70]*** [5.83]***
GDP per capita 4.844 2.566 5.325 1.920
[2.73]*** [1.26] [3.07]*** [0.77]
Inflation -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[2.92]*** [3.21]*** [1.94]* [1.74]*
Dual exchange rate 0.943 0.374 -1.313 -1.950
[0.67] [0.29] [0.95] [1.22]
Other flows to GDP -0.026 0.021 -0.020 0.004
[0.78] [0.68] [0.62] [0.11]
Exports to GDP 0.167 0.065 0.030 -0.102
[4.76]*** [1.16] [0.87] [1.48]
Financial liberalization 3.669 4.286
[2.91]*** [2.77]***
Constant -514.466 -775.204 -763.790 -1176.806
[4.66]*** [4.67]*** [5.81]*** [5.77]***
Observations 1181 927 1174 927
Number of Countries 86 60 86 60
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cragg Donald F-statistic for weak instruments 15.02 14.57 14.96 14.57
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 0.43 0.34 2.44 3.99
P-value for Sargan test 0.81 0.85 0.30 0.14
Bank Deposits to GDP Bank Credit to GDP
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Figure 1 
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Figure 3 
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Appendix Table 1 
Countries and Periods Included 
 
Country Years Country Years Country Years
Algeria 1980 - 1988 Ghana 1979 - 1997 Nigeria 1977 - 1993
Argentina 1978 - 2003 Grenada 1986 - 1990 Pakistan 1976 - 2003
Armenia 1995 - 2003 Guatemala 1977 - 2001 Panama 1980 - 2002
Bangladesh 1994 - 2003 Haiti 1975 - 2003 Papua New Guinea 1976 - 2001
Barbados 1975 - 2002 Honduras 1975 - 2003 Paraguay 1975 - 2003
Belarus 1995 - 2003 Hungary 1995 - 2003 Peru 1990 - 2003
Belize 1984 - 2002 India 1975 - 2002 Philippines 1977 - 2003
Benin 1992 - 2001 Indonesia 1983 - 2003 Poland 1994 - 2003
Bolivia 1976 - 2003 Jamaica 1976 - 2003 Romania 1994 - 2003
Botswana 1975 - 2002 Jordan 1977 - 2003 Rwanda 1976 - 2002
Brazil 1980 - 2003 Kazakhstan 1995 - 2003 Senegal 1975 - 2002
Bulgaria 1992 - 2003 Kenya 1975 - 2003 Seychelles 1989 - 2002
Burkina Faso 1983 - 2001 Kyrgyz Republic 1996 - 2003 Sierra Leone 1980 - 2001
Cameroon 1979 - 1995 Lao PDR 1988 - 2001 Slovak Republic 1994 - 2003
Central African Republic 1982 - 1993 Latvia 1996 - 2003 South Africa 1985 - 2001
Chad 1985 - 1994 Lithuania 1994 - 2003 Sri Lanka 1975 - 2003
Chile 1983 - 2003 Madagascar 1975 - 2003 St. Kitts and Nevis 1986 - 1990
China 1987 - 2001 Malawi 1994 - 2000 Sudan 1984 - 1997
Colombia 1975 - 2003 Malaysia 1975 - 2003 Suriname 1978 - 1994
Congo, Rep. 1995 - 2002 Maldives 1996 - 2003 Swaziland 1975 - 2002
Costa Rica 1977 - 2003 Mali 1988 - 2002 Syrian Arab Republic 1992 - 2002
Cote d'Ivoire 1975 - 2002 Mauritania 1986 - 1997 Thailand 1975 - 2003
Croatia 1994 - 2003 Mauritius 1981 - 2003 Togo 1975 - 2002
Dominica 1986 - 2002 Mexico 1979 - 2001 Tonga 1985 - 1993
Dominican Republic 1975 - 2003 Moldova 1995 - 2001 Trinidad and Tobago 1983 - 2002
Ecuador 1976 - 2001 Morocco 1976 - 2003 Tunisia 1988 - 2003
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977 - 2003 Mozambique 1996 - 2002 Turkey 1987 - 2003
El Salvador 1977 - 2003 Namibia 1991 - 2001 Vanuatu 1982 - 2001
Estonia 1994 - 2003 Nepal 1996 - 2001 Venezuela, RB 1997 - 2002
Fiji 1979 - 1988 Nicaragua 1977 - 1993 Zimbabwe 1980 - 1993
Gabon 1978 - 1999 Niger 1975 - 1995  
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Appendix 2: Remittance Data 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, total remittances are the sum of three components: 
compensation of employees (under income balance of current account), workers’ 
remittances (under current transfers) and migrant transfers (under capital account). These 
data were primarily obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook, reported in the IMF’s 2005 World Economic Outlook. 
 
Compensation of employees should not be part of total remittances for Argentina, 
Australia, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, 
Cape Verde, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, 
Italy, Panama, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Turkey, and Venezuela 
 
In general, “other current transfers” are NOT included in the definition of total 
remittances, except for Kenya, Malaysia, and Syria, where the Balance of Payment 
Yearbook specifies explicitly that migrants’ remittances are recorded under “other current 
transfers”. 
 
For countries for which data were not available, IMF desk economists were contacted and 
the following data and/or information were provided: 
 
1. Bulgaria: Other current transfers should be included in the remittances figure. 
2. Haiti: Added remittances inflows data for 1991-2003. 
3. Iran: Other current transfers should be used as the figure for total remittances. 
4. Moldova: Added remittances data for 2000. 
5. Niger: Added remittances inflows data for 1995-2003. 
6. Romania: Added remittances data for 2000-2003. 
7. Slovak Republic: Added remittances data for 1999-2003. 
8. Ukraine: Added remittances data for 2000. 
9. Venezuela: Added remittances inflows data for 1997-2003. 
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Appendix Table 3 
Panel Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Financial Development 
Fixed Effects Results with Liquid Liabilities 
The regression equation estimated is of the form FDi,t= b1Remi,t + b2Xi,t + ai + ui,t where in this case FD refers to financial development measured as the % of 
liquid liabilities to GDP. Remittances to GDP is the share of remittances as a % of GDP. X is a matrix of controls including: GDP per capita, measured in 
constant dollars; Log of GDP, stated in constant dollars; Inflation, defined as the % change in the GDP deflator; Dual Exchange Rates, a dummy capturing 
periods when multiple exchange rates were in effect; Financial Liberalization, a dummy identifying periods of liberalization in domestic interest rates, Other 
flows to GDP, defined as foreign direct investment + Non-FDI private inflows + aid expressed as a % of GDP and Exports to GDP, the share of total exports as a 
% of GDP. Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Remittances to GDP 0.425 0.399 0.467 0.431 0.317 0.371 0.418 0.321
[6.11]*** [6.01]*** [6.80]*** [6.36]*** [4.42]*** [5.44]*** [5.89]*** [4.56]***
Log of GDP 15.362 14.862 14.833 13.020 9.827 18.020 16.557 8.010
[13.36]*** [12.28]*** [11.44]*** [11.05]*** [4.98]*** [8.01]*** [7.04]*** [4.04]***
GDP Per Capita 3.678 5.468 3.034 3.943 4.437 4.031 2.121 4.324
[4.41]*** [5.14]*** [2.66]*** [4.39]*** [4.95]*** [3.40]*** [1.70]* [4.53]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[2.59]*** [2.73]*** [2.89]*** [2.91]*** [2.69]*** [2.79]*** [2.93]*** [2.97]***
Dual Exchange Rate -2.276 -0.865 -1.032 -0.960 -2.275 -0.706 -0.808 -0.910
[2.95]*** [1.13] [1.29] [1.23] [2.95]*** [0.93] [1.01] [1.15]
Financial Liberalization 0.259 0.120 3.881 4.044
[0.42] [0.19] [5.11]*** [5.07]***
Other Flows to GDP -0.008 -0.033 0.004 -0.022
[0.43] [1.85]* [0.20] [1.20]
Exports to GDP 0.254 0.312 0.248 0.315
[7.41]*** [14.18]*** [7.30]*** [14.28]***
Constant -318.748 -316.622 -319.326 -277.962 -188.464 -384.567 -353.938 -159.411
[12.62]*** [11.79]*** [11.19]*** [10.76]*** [4.22]*** [7.46]*** [6.60]*** [3.55]***
Observations 1867 1367 1257 1586 1867 1367 1257 1586
Number of Countries 103 66 65 96 103 66 65 96
Time Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.21 0.31 0.35 0.32
Liquid liabilities to GDP
With Time Dummies Without Time Dummies
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Appendix 4:  Note on the impact of measurement error 
 
Given  t i t i t i v x y , , , + = β ,   t i t i t i u x x ,
*
, , + =  and  0 ) , cov(
* = u x  
 
where x is measured with error and 
* x is the true value of x, it can be shown that  
 
β










where b is the estimated value of the coefficient. 
 
Furthermore, given that  ) var( ) var( ) var(















































Given that in our sample standard deviation of x (or the standard deviation of remittances) equals 
4.52 then this implies that std.dev(u) would equal 4.17. Considering that the mean of x is 2.95, 
this suggests that the size of the measurement error of x, remittance, could be close to 142% of x. 
This number is within the existing estimates of the size of informal remittances which range 
between 20 and 200% of formal remittances. 